What kinds of social policy interventions will enable South Africa to offer a universal, free and sustainable antretroviral treatment programme? Some commentators assert that government's best chance at offering such a programme will require the use of compulsory licenses and that the state's failure to make use of such a weapon is a failure to discharge its constitutional duties. The authors demur. The threat of a compulsory license is only as good as the ability to make use of such a license. South Africa currently lacks the basic science community, reverse engineering capacity and fine chemicals industry necessary to make good on such a threat. The government's best hope for discharging the duties imposed by the Constitution is a systematic, structural intervention: the implementation of a socio-industrial policy that leverages existing industrial capacity and voluntary licenses in a manner that generates price reductions and offers an uninterrupted sustainable local supply. However, voluntary licenses will only create downward pressure on prices when South Africa is able to establish a robust generics pharmaceutical industry. Such an industry can be created with appropriate tax relief, investment credits, technology transfer and assured access to active pharmaceutical ingredients. South Africa's industrial, legal and financial resources can thereby be profitably exploited in a manner that progressively achieves a comprehensive and coordinated antiretroviral treatment programme.
I INTRODUCTION
Two facts about HIV/AIDS in South Africa are well-known. First, over five and a half million adults and children are infected. Second, a lack of political will leaves our society without the kind of treatment programme that might turn a deadly disease into a chronic illness. 1 Instead, according to current projections, 3.5 million South Africans will die of AIDSrelated infections by 2010. 2 It doesn't have to be this way.
3 South Africa possesses the industrial capacity, together with the financial, legal, and human resources necessary to provide a sustainable supply of low cost medicines for those members of our HIV-infected population who require treatment.
How do we know? Brazil. As we demonstrate in part II of this article, Brazil's creation of a successful free, universal antiretroviral treatment ('ART') programme for the HIV-infected population of 660,000 who require treatment is not simply a function of rarefied legal principle married to a conscious, progressive social policy. It is, in large part, an unintended consequence of a series of domestic laws and international agreements not directly linked to the distribution of health entitlements. A long history of exceptions for medicinal patents, a relatively recent commitment to fairness and to equity in public procurement laws, a robust local pharmaceutical industry, and long-standing state support for a public laboratory capable of reverse engineering active pharmaceutical ingredients ('APIs') constitute just a few of the enabling conditions that have, quite fortuitously, put the Brazilian government in a position to make good the promise of free universal antiretroviral treatment for those who require it.
Part of the recipe for Brazil's success lies in conditions for which no one person or regime can take responsibility: Brazil benefits from a social, political, legal, economic and industrial environment that cannot, in very important respects, be replicated here. For example, Brazil lacked meaningful patent protection up until 1996. South Africa did not. Brazil made significant investments in state research laboratories in the 1990s. Such investments would now be prohibitively expensive to undertake in South Africa and would likely yield little tangible return. However, Brazil offers less a discrete set of instructions for how a low-or middle-income country can introduce an ART programme comparable to that found in the developed world, and more a guide as to how a middle-income country like South Africa can exploit its existing industrial capacity, intellectual capital and legal framework to create a sustainable ART programme underpinned by affordable, generic medicines.
In part III below, we describe how the social, economic and legal conditions that currently obtain in South Africa make possible a universal, free ART programme. We begin with the following bromide: that, at a minimum, the Constitution requires the state to provide a truly comprehensive and coordinated ART programme, and that the state has, thus far, failed to put such a programme into place. We contend, then, that the government's best hope for discharging the duties imposed by s 27 is a socio-industrial policy that leverages existing industrial capacity and voluntary licenses in a manner that generates price reductions. Such downward pressure on prices -in concert with other government programmes -should secure the greatest amount of lifesaving medicines for the greatest number of South Africans. 13 The rudiments of such a programme are, indeed, already on the books.
14 The National Drug Policy states that the procurement and sustainable supply of low cost medicines for the entire HIV-infected population requiring treatment are essential for a successful rollout, and recommends that South Africa exploit its existing manufacturing 13 The provision of an affordable, sustainable supply of ARVs is a critical component of a successful ART programme, and is thus the focus of this article. We recognise the importance of human resources and infrastructure, and most importantly, government leadership as necessary conditions for the success of the kind of ART programme contemplated here. 14 We must also acknowledge at the outset the crucial role played by civil society in the advancement of ART policy in South Africa. We believe readers of the SAJHR are wellacquainted with that recent history. Indeed, people outside of South Africa are quite familiar with the politics surrounding access to ART in South Africa. As the popular US website, Salon.com, observes, 'the South African government's slow response to the AIDS crisis South Africa's hesitations and missteps on the issue are well-chronicled.' 'The AIDS Drug Warrior' Salon.com (18 June 2001) available at <http://www.salon.com>. This article, then, does not attempt to rehearse the well-established literature on the campaign for access to antiretrovirals in South Africa -led chiefly and successfully by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the AIDS Law Project (ALP). Instead, we offer an additional -and in many ways compatible -policy response to the particular problem of providing low-cost ARVs for the entire South African population.
capacity to produce low-cost generics. 15 The national Department of Health's Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment Programme echoes similar themes. For the state to satisfy constitutional desiderata, it must make a genuine effort to implement important features of both documents.
Not only are the makings of a robust policy part of the public record, we will show that South Africa possesses the requisite space to manoeuvre successfully within the existing regulatory structure and the intellectual property regime ('IPR') that govern the manufacture and the distribution of generic ARVs. Although the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ('TRIPS') and the Patent Amendment Act have tightened the current intellectual property rights regime -just as public health demand for existing and new medicines has grown -international and domestic law retain sufficient flexibility for South Africa to meet its public health objectives and its constitutional obligations.
In terms of drug pricing, the dominant rate-limiting factor is a lack of competition amongst suppliers. We show that the state's current ARV rollout programme evinces a sub-optimal approach to price negotiations because South Africa has not constructed an industrial policy that promotes the local production of generic ARVs. 16 Where we differ markedly from other authors who have written in these pages is on the extent to which compulsory licenses -or the threat of such licenses -can be used to leverage lower prices. 17 Contrary to Bollyky's view, the threat of a compulsory license is only as good as the ability to make use of such a license. South Africa currently lacks that capacity. South Africa does not as yet possess a basic science or research community capable of undertaking the complex task of reverse engineering required for the creation of generic ARVs. There is no local fine chemicals industry capable of producing all of the APIs required for the mass manufacture of ARVs. In the absence of these two prerequisites alone, the threat of compulsory licenses to lower drug prices is empty. Moreover, we would argue that, as things currently stand, such a threat will not achieve the goal -a robust and sustainable ART programme to meet the needs of the HIV-infected population who require treatment for life. As we shall see, Bollyky's largely rhetorical battle with multi-15 Government of the Republic of South Africa, National Drug Policy (1996) . 16 The provision of an affordable, sustainable supply of ARVs is a critical component of a successful ART programme, and is thus the focus of this article. We recognise the importance of such factors as human resources, infrastructure and, most importantly, government leadership to ensure the success of ART programmes. nationals and the South African government has blinded him (and others) to the virtues of voluntary licenses.
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Voluntary licenses minimise the potential for re-exportation of drugs and curtail, as the World Health Organisation (WHO) notes, the real dangers to patients associated with black and grey markets in ARVs. 19 In the context of a legal regime that effectively bars re-exportation of drugs to primary markets in developed countries, many multinational companies (patent-holders) provide voluntary licenses with no royalty requirements and complete tech transfers. 20 From the perspective of South African policy-makers and local manufacturers, these agreements place ARV production on a solid legal footing and avoid legal wars of attrition.
Because little attention has been paid to voluntary licenses, critics of government policy have also overlooked South Africa's increasing capacity to produce generic ARVs for both domestic and sub-Saharan African markets. We review the economic fundamentals that must be in place in order for South Africa to establish a robust generics pharmaceutical industry for ARVs. Unlike Brazil, local production of APIs is not as important in South Africa as is continued access to them. While India, China, Brazil and South Korea, amongst others, are capable of supplying many of the APIs required to produce ARVs, what South Africa requires -and the Constitution demands -is the proper mix of policy and tax incentives to support a generic pharmaceutical industry for ARVs that 'owns the cow'. The Department of Trade and Industry's recent Strategic Investment Programme ('SIP') provided the incentive to construct at least one major plant capable of producing formulated 18 Voluntary licences (VLs) enable manufacturers to produce and sell generic versions of patented products. 19 A World Health Organisation survey of 20 countries, conducted between January 1999 and October 2000, found that 60 per cent of counterfeit medicine cases occurred in poor countries and 40 per cent in industrialised countries. The US FDA estimates that 10 per cent of pharmaceuticals worldwide are counterfeit medicines and 25 per cent of medicines in developing countries are fake or substandard. For pharmaceutical companies, the primary concern is that counterfeits cause their efficacious products to be perceived as being harmful or ineffective. See generic ARVs. 21 We will demonstrate that the proper macro-industrial policy -one committed to increasing local manufacturing capacity and voluntary licensing -will put South Africa in the best possible position to produce the requisite level of ARV and TB medicines for a successful domestic ART programme. 22 Moreover, we argue that with appropriate government tax relief, investment credits, technology transfer and assured access to APIs, the pharmaceutical industry in South Africa could gain a comparative advantage as a producer of ARVs become a supplier of low-cost pharmaceuticals to the rest of the continent.
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South Africa is, therefore, in a position to make its own luck. It may not be Brazil, but its industrial, legal and financial resources can all be profitably harnessed in a manner that progressively realises the comprehensive and coordinated ARV programme that s 27 and more general considerations of social justice demand.
II THE HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONDITIONS THAT MADE POSSIBLE BRAZIL'S POLICY OF UNIVERSAL, FREE ANTIRETROVIRALS
A cursory reading of the secondary literature might lead students of the subject to the conclusion that Brazil's national AIDS programme (NAP) was solely a consequence of a constitutional right to health, 24 a savvy social movement 25 and the progressive health agenda of the government. We do not wish to deny that the right to health and a politics of solidarity were necessary conditions for the rollout. We contend, however, that an emphasis on abstract legal principle and politics of solidarity obscures how the unintended consequences of a series of domestic laws and international agreements not directly linked to the distribution of health entitlements conspired with a relatively unique mix of economic, historical and political conditions to produce Brazil's largely successful experiment in free, universal access to ARVs. The new constitution's commitment to democracy and the rule of law meant a concomitant commitment to rooting out the corruption that long-plagued both the public and the private sectors. The 1988 Constitution states that public procurement of 'goods and services must comply with the principles of legality, impartiality and transparency.'
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Several early decisions handed down by the federal courts confirmed the justiciability and the efficacy of these principles.
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These generic principles of fairness were extended by the 1993 Call for Tender Law. 28 According to the Tender Law, all government contracts had to proceed by way of public and standardised solicitation of the goods to be acquired under conditions of fair competition. The Tender Law also attempted to extend the benefits of competition beyond the mere creation of markets in public goods. It aimed to ensure that many of the competitors in these markets were Brazilian companies, by giving preference to '(i) goods produced or services supplied by domestic companies; (ii) goods produced in the country; (iii) goods produced or services provided by companies established in Brazil.' 29 This system of unadulterated 'national preference' was, as Orsi, Hasenclever, Fialho, Tigre, and Coriat note, short-lived. 30 products' and opened most tenders to foreign competition. 31 While the liberalisation of trade was a bracing tonic for Brazilian industry, the opening up of the South American country to full-fledged market competition remained an important stimulus for growth in the pharmaceuticals industry. And it is this growth, as we shall see, that created the conditions under which subsequent local production of ARVs could more readily occur.
(b) Intellectual property rights as an economic stimulant: how Brazil's IPR regime created local capacity to produce generic ARVs A parallel set of conditions, unrelated to the political transition, provided a different sort of traction for the local pharmaceutical industry. In 1971, Brazil suspended the laws governing intellectual property for pharmaceuticals. The state exploited this suspension by creating a parastatal called Companhia de Desenvolvimento Tecnolo´gico (CODETEC). CODETEC partnered academics with technicians from the Ministry of Industry and Trade. CODETEC's function was to provide the institutional home for academics and professionals engaged in the reverse engineering process of the key components of all drugs: active pharmaceutical ingredients ('APIs'). The goal was to acquire the capacity to produce synthetic variations on APIs. Once CODETEC had discovered how to create the synthetic version of an API, the knowledge was transferred to entities in the private sector that possessed the production capacity to manufacture the final product.
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Brazil's quarter century of non-compliance with international intellectual property norms had the obvious benefit of providing 'products' that a local pharmaceutical industry could manufacture. The profits from such production created the enabling conditions for the manufacture of new lines of products. 33 As a result, Brazil currently has 19 local firms and 9 public laboratories capable of producing ARVs. 34 What the 1971 to 1996 period of non-compliance did not do, however, was address Brazil's limited capacity with respect to the production of the raw materials required for APIs. This limited capacity significantly constrains its ability to produce generic ARVs. 35 It also makes Brazil dependent on countries with that capacity -namely India and China -who may not always be in a position, legally or politically, to provide the APIs or the raw materials required for their production. 36 That said, downstream diversification of the world's 6th largest petrochemical industrythrough the development of new fine chemical processes and technology production -promises a future of enhanced API production capacity for Brazil.
37
Two relatively recent developments in IPR further diminished Brazil's capacity to produce sufficient APIs for a sustainable and effective programme of free, universal access to ARVs required for the treatment of AIDS. The 1996 Patent Law brought the Brazil pharmaceutical industry back within the domain of legal constraint imposed by TRIPS and other international agreements regarding intellectual property rights. Although the law does permit Brazilian companies to continue production of drugs -and thus ARVs -in circulation prior to 1996, its retroactive deposit application has meant that international pharmaceutical companies could seek registration of 'patents . . . valid abroad or pending in Brazil' at the time of the law's passage. It also means that international drug companies could both patent their new drugs and enforce their patents in Brazil after the law's enactment. At the same time, however, art 68 of the Brazilian Patent Law -echoing TRIPSenables Brazil to issue compulsory licenses where a public health crisis so warrants.
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The law's divide between the past (pre-1996) and the future (post-1996) has had profound consequences for the ARV procurement strategy pursued by Brazil's Ministry of Health. Only drugs in circulation prior to 1996 in Brazil -or those whose patents have not yet been enforced subsequent to the 1996 Patent Law's enactment -can be copied for local use. The patent law is, however, only one of an array of deleterious consequences of trade liberalisation for the Brazilian pharmaceuticals industry. According to Orsi and others, Brazil has lost a significant percentage of 'its industrial capability to produce synthetic intermediates and raw materials' for ARVs and other pharmaceuticals. 39 Projects initiated in the 1980s, when Brazil's industry was relatively cosseted, can no longer compete on a playing field levelled by the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. This loss of production capacity, married to restrictive patent laws and a dependence on foreign sources of APIs, will, in future, limit Brazil's ability to leverage lower prices through threatened use of compulsory licenses. 40 While international competition and trade liberalisation has blunted the growth of a local synthetics industry, Brazil's commitment of significant state resources to the free, universal rollout of ARVs and extant local capacity for production of generics means that the fundamentals required for the expansion of the resource base for the manufacture of ARVs still exist. However, Brazil must carefully husband these resources should it wish to remain in a position to pressure other states and multinational pharmaceutical companies into the knowledgesharing and asymmetric pricing arrangements that currently enable the Brazilian fiscus to make good on its current commitments.
(c) Priming the pump: how public laboratories create the capacity for local production of generics and make effective the threat (or the use) of compulsory licenses
The Brazilian government has been quite aware of the precariousness of its bargaining position vis-a`-vis TRIPS, the multinational pharmaceutical companies, and the quickly closing window of opportunity it has had to secure access to APIs and generics from countries such as India, China and South Korea. 41 Perhaps the boldest step, and the step most likely to continue to pay dividends in the near term, was the Brazilian health ministry's decision in 1997 to fund efforts of the Far-Manguinhos stateowned pharmaceutical laboratory to reverse engineer pharmaceuticals used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS. 42 As Cassier and Correa note, the primary objective of this state-sponsored generics initiative was the realisation of lower prices for a range of agents including APIs so that the 40 Such transfer strengthens what we have already seen to be a knowledge-intensive sector. Secondly, and more importantly for our immediate purposes, the process operates as an insurance policy. Should multinational firms refuse to supply ARVs at a cost that makes Brazil's programme sustainable, the government retains the capacity to produce generic ARVs. That is, the capacity of Far-Manguinhos to reverse engineer ARVs ensures that Brazil's threat to use compulsory licenses remains credible. Moreover, given the uncertainty surrounding how TRIPS enforcement will affect the importation of generics from India, China and elsewhere, the ability of Far-Manguinhos to produce the end product -if not all of the APIs themselves -gives Brazil a certain degree of security should it be forced to go it alone. Thirdly, as Lucchini notes, meaningful price decreases only occur when 'buyers have the power to substitute between multiple suppliers.' 45 Brazil's introduction of generic substitutes and its willingness to invest in future drugs that may never come on line creates the spectre of multiple suppliers and, consequently, a continued downward trend in price. 46 At a somewhat higher level of abstraction, the Brazilian government's decade's worth of investment in Far-Manguinhos reflects its ability to recognize the complexity of the political-economic landscape and to construct long-term strategies to cater for a variety of different contingencies. It also stands as an implicit critique of the South African government's refusal to engage in anything that resembles a coordinated and comprehensive programme to ensure that the health needs of its citizenry are met. anecdote of a patient in Khayelitsha who exemplifies some of the challenges patients in many developing countries face. The patient takes a first-line treatment that includes zidovudine, lamivudine and nevirapine. Zidovudine and lamivudine come together in a single pill called a fixed dose combination, which means the patient only needs to take two pills per day. However, if this patient is one of the 10 per cent to 30 per cent who will become resistant, he will then begin second-line treatment, which according to Darder and Boulle will consist of didanosine, ritonavir-boosted lopinavir and tenofovir. His daily pill count will increase to 11 pills, taken at three different times of the day. But that's not all. The price of second-line therapy costs $1,285 per year -nearly three and a half times the cost of average first line therapy ($363 per year). The higher costs will, naturally, limit the total numbers of patients who can be treated. Darder and Boulle note that the difference in price exists largely due to the lack of generic competition in the second-line market. Far-Manguinhos further serves as a visible reminder that health is a public good. In the current international climate, the neo-liberal discourse of markets, free trade and privatisation dominate politics. Capitalism's privatisation of the public good induces a powerful form of amnesia: we forget that France did not permit pharmaceutical patents until 1959; that Germany followed suit in 1969 and that other industrialised and developed nations have only done so quite recently (Japan (1976), Switzerland (1977) , Italy (1978) , Sweden (1978) , and Spain (1992)). 48 Brazil's stance harkens back to a time -not long past -when medicinal drugs were simply not patentable.
Brazil's retreat on patents then must be viewed as strategic. The government's ability to take the long view and make investments in FarManguinhos that may never result in the direct diminution of ARV costs demonstrates that this retreat has not, as yet, displaced a deeper commitment to political solidarity. As Brazil's Ministry of Health noted in the following one-page advertisement in The New York Times:
AIDS is not a business. The Brazilian Ministry of Health distributes the anti-AIDS cocktail free in Brazil to anyone who needs it. . . . Local manufacturing of many of the drugs used in the anti-AIDS cocktail is not a declaration of war against the drugs industry. It is simply a fight for life. We have noted with some concern that Brazil's National AIDS Programme remains quite dependent upon countries with the capacity -namely India, China and South Korea -and the willingness to provide generics or the APIs required for their production. The fragility of the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry and an international climate somewhat hostile to the production of generic versions of drugs under patent means that Brazil's ARV programme will remain vulnerable. Such compliance could have ended Brazil's access to India's market in generics and APIs. However, as several authors note, s 92A(1) of the Patents (Amendment) Act actually expands the scope of issuance of compulsory licences for the manufacture and the export of 'patented pharmaceutical products'. 51 More importantly for Brazil, s 92A(1) enables countries with insufficient production capacity to manufacture their own pharmaceutical products under compulsory licensing and to import such products if it simply provides the required 'notification of need' for the drug in terms of TRIPS and the Doha Agreement.
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India's expanded compulsory licensing provisions permit its generics' industry to produce the drugs required for its own domestic consumption and secures, for the time being, the continued access of other developing countries to its store of generics. Whether the Indian government has struck an acceptable balance between demands for TRIPS-compliant intellectual property protection and public health requirements remains to be seen. 53 One obvious virtue of the Indian law's language is that it does not require the importing country to issue a compulsory license. At the level of rhetoric, therefore, Brazil can maintain its claim that it has yet to abrogate its international commitments with respect to patent protection. Such a claim remains an important tool in negotiations with multinational pharmaceutical companies and with countries such as the United States that press for greater patent protection than TRIPS in fact requires. At the level of lived experience, the continued access to India's generics indicates that Brazil should be able to continue to exploit the 56 Both countries must contend with the demands of realising the democratic ends of their new constitutional democracies against the backdrop of the world's two highest Gini coefficients.
Like Brazil, South Africa possesses a sophisticated civil society that has championed the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS. Unlike Brazil, South Africa's government has neither pressed a progressive political agenda with regard to HIV/AIDS, nor implemented the multiple dimensional policy framework -from industrial policy, to drug procurement to human resource development -required for an effective national ARV rollout. Indeed, despite the lip-service paid to effecting a universal rollout, the current government appears to be in the thrall of rather outre´theories that either deny the causality of HIV with respect to AIDS or the efficacy of ARVs with respect to the treatment of AIDS. 57 Moreover, in Brazil, we have seen that the deleterious effects of the liberalisation of trade on the pharmaceutical industry have been tempered by an industrial policy designed to ensure that the Brazilian state is able to afford a sustainable ARV programme. No such counterweight to liberalisation as yet obtains in South Africa. Industrial policy has been driven largely by the desire to attract foreign direct investment. 58 Assuming that this neo-liberal framework will continue to shape the political landscape, we offer an argument that demonstrates how extant industrial policies in South Africa can be profitably exploited to promote the development of a sustainable ARV treatment programme.
(a) The legal environment (i) A justiciable constitutional right to health
The South African Constitution contains one of the few genuinely justiciable constitutional rights to health care. 59 The content of that right -although it remains contested -has been fleshed out by the courts in a number of important cases. 60 For our limited purposes, we can extract the following principles from this complex body of jurisprudence:
58 Over ten years ago, the new government forged a specific social contract with the South African people. The Reconstruction and Development Programme ('RDP') -an integrated and sustainable poverty alleviation programme for the nation -viewed poverty as the greatest threat to the new South Africa. However, as Southall and others note, the highly progressive RDP was largely superseded by the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy ('GEAR'). GEAR shifted government's approach from direct expenditure on social entitlements for such basic goods as health, housing, water, food and employment to a more indirect, market-based approach. . The right to health-care services does not, generally speaking, embrace an entitlement to the immediate award of a remedy in the event of a breach;
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. The right simply requires the state to progressively realise the access to health care services for individual members of the polity and to do so within 'available resources';
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. Whether the state has discharged its duty to progressively realise the right will be evaluated by the courts in terms of the 'reasonableness' of the plan;
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. To be found reasonable, a comprehensive and coordinated programme to realise the right to health: (1) must ensure that 'the appropriate financial and human resources are available'; (2) 'must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right'; (3) must be reasonable 'both in their conception and their implementation'; (4) must attend to 'crises'; (5) must not exclude 'a significant segment' of the affected population; and (6) must 'respond to the urgent needs of those in desperate situations.' 129, 137 (CA)('I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a patient or a patient's family sought would be provided if doctors were willing to give it, no matter how much it cost, particularly when a life was potentially at stake. It would however, in my view, be shutting one's eyes to the real world if the Court were to proceed on the basis that we do live in such a world. It is common knowledge that health authorities of all kinds are constantly pressed to make ends meet. They cannot pay their nurses as much as they would like; they cannot provide the treatments they would like; they cannot purchase all the extremely expensive medical equipment they would like; they cannot carry out all the research they would like; they cannot build all the hospitals and specialist units they would like. Difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients.') 63 See Khosa (note 60 above) para 43: 'In determining reasonableness, context is all-important.
There is no closed list of factors involved in the reasonableness enquiry and the relevance of various factors will be determined on a case by case basis depending on the particular facts and circumstances in question.' 64 See Grootboom (note 60 above) paras 39-46, 52, 53, 63-69, 74, 83. determined to be HIV positive sought orders declaring that, under s 35(2)(e), they had the 'the right . . . to . . . the provision, at State expense, of adequate . . . medical treatment.' 65 The High Court held that the two prisoners who had been prescribed a combination of AZT 66 and ddl by medical practitioners were entitled to provision of that cocktail at state expense, but that the two prisoners who had not as yet been prescribed either antiviral mono-therapy or antiviral dual therapy were not entitled to provision of any treatment at state expense. Although not decided under s 27, but under the health care provision for prisoners under s 35(2), Van Biljon stands for the proposition that socio-economic rights do not entitle individuals to specific remedies unless the state has already committed itself to the provision of specific benefits. Thus, in Van Biljon, only the first two applicants are provided with ARVs because only the first two applicants could form a legitimate expectation that the state would provide them with such treatment.
Similarly, in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign ('TAC'), the applicants took issue with the South African government's policy toward the provision of nevirapine, an antiretroviral drug that reduces the likelihood of HIV transmission from mother to child by one-half to two-thirds. 67 Despite the fact that the manufacturers of nevirapine had offered to make the drug available to the South African government free of charge for a period of five years in order to reduce the risk of the vertical transmission of HIV, only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands of pregnant women infected with HIV had access to nevirapine at an equally small number of research and training sites throughout the country. 68 The Constitutional Court held that, in terms of s 27, the government's decision to confine nevirapine to a limited number of research and training sites was manifestly not reasonable. 69 The TAC Court found that a comprehensive and coordinated programme of nevirapine and breast milk substitutes could substantially reduce the risk 65 1997 (4) SA 441 (C). All four had CD4 counts of less than 400/ml. All four therefore satisfied generally accepted criteria for antiretroviral treatment at the time. Two of the prisoners had already been prescribed appropriate antiretrovirals by medical practitioners. The other two prisoners had not had any antiretroviral treatment prescribed by the state. 66 Azidothymidine or zidovudine (commonly known as AZT or ZDV) was the first antiretroviral drug approved for the treatment of HIV. of vertical transmission of HIV without placing a significant burden on the fiscus. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court issued a mandamus that required the government to extend the provision of nevirapine beyond the current sites and ordered the government to provide the requisite testing and counseling services needed to make effective use of nevirapine.
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TAC may seem like an easy case whose reach is rather limited. That is, TAC could be viewed as simply extending a benefit to a class of person who might have already formed a legitimate expectation of an entitlement to that benefit. But TAC required somewhat more of the Court. It required the Court to assess whether the state possessed the available resources necessary to make a comprehensive and coordinated programme of universal nevirapine provision possible. The TAC Court found that the state did.
This finding has an important bearing on our assessment of current government policy regarding the rollout of ARVs. What we argue, in the analysis that follows, is that the government has the necessary resources to create a low-cost coordinated, comprehensive and universal ARV treatment programme. Not only does TRIPS permit the importation of or the local production of ARVs (including APIs) necessary for affordable treatment, South Africa possesses the nascent industrial capacity necessary to produce inexpensive generics. What South Africa can do to exploit such capacity -in terms of law and industrial policyis discussed below. Failure to properly utilise such readily available tools -in the context of 3.5 million South African deaths by 2010 -may well constitute a failure to provide the comprehensive and coordinated programme s 27 requires.
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(ii) Intellectual property rights
The Constitution does not constitute a meaningful constraint on the access to essential medicines for the government's HIV/AIDS programme. Intellectual property rights ('IPR') do.
TRIPS and our own Patent Amendment Act have certainly tightened the current intellectual property rights regime. However, both documents contain significant flexibility with respect to securing access to medicines deemed essential to meet public health objectives for developing countries. Moreover, recent litigation in the High Court, and complaints before the Competition Commission and Competition Tribunal, demonstrate that the South African government has the necessary space to produce a socio-industrial policy that could -under the correct macroeconomic conditions -support a sustainable ART programme.
(aa) International Intellectual Property Regime: WTO and TRIPS The World Trade Organization (WTO) governs international trade in goods, services, and intellectual property (IP). 72 The WTO was officially established in 1994, supplanting its forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
73 Under GATT, IP was largely unregulated.
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Even prior to the WTO's creation, the United States and other industrialised countries began to link IP protection to international trade. 75 The growing importance of IP on the international trade agenda led to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS requires WTO members to set forth minimum standards by which they will enforce intellectual property rights. Its ostensible purpose is the harmonisation of patent protection within the strictures of the multilateral trading system. They agreed to extend the principle of most-favoured nation, whereby a party that accords any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity to any product originating in or destined for any other country must extend the same benefit to the life product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. In such bilateral agreements, a minimum of two countries would benefit. However, a multiplier effect of rights and obligations would be passed on to other countries. Because prices on pharmaceutical products will generally rise when patent protection is introduced or increased, 77 TRIPS has been the focus of efforts to negotiate the inevitable conflict between IP protection and the promotion of access to life-saving essential medicines in developing countries. 78 The WTO process to address the tension between providing pills and protecting patents began to gain traction during the Doha Round in 2001. The resulting Doha Declaration confirmed that TRIPS should be interpreted in such a way as to support WTO members' rights to protect public health and to promote access to medicines for all. Most importantly, the Declaration reaffirmed that art 31 of TRIPS allows all WTO members to grant compulsory licenses in order to protect public health. 79 Compulsory licensing enables a government to permit a third party to produce a patented product or to use a patented process without consent of the owner of the patent. 80 With the primacy of public health affirmed, Doha was viewed as a tangible win for developing countries and heralded as a major step forward in the global campaign for access to essential medicines. 81 In spite of this apparent progress, fundamental conflicts between the political imperatives of developed countries and the developing countries remained unresolved. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration called for the finding of 'an expeditious solution to the problem of the difficulties that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face in making effective use of compulsory 77 This increase is generally related to the following factors: the degree of competitiveness of the local pharmaceutical market prior to patent protection; the larger the market share of copied drugs; and the more price inelastic the demand for medicines. See After two years of thorny negotiations, a resolution was achieved. All members agreed to use the procedures outlined in art 31(f) to implement para 6, ie, to exercise use of compulsory licensing. However, many NGOs were dismayed with the final agreement, indicating that it was too complex, bureaucratic and slow to be implemented by developing countries in practice. 83 On 30 August 2003, the General Council issued a decision with regard to the Implementation of para 6. The General Council held that an interim waiver would remain in effect until an Amendment to TRIPS could be formulated. No such amendment has been forthcoming.
Whether Doha will produce significant benefits for the developing world remains to be seen. Only Canada, for example, has issued a compulsory license to gain access to medicines. Moreover, after Doha, the US and other developed nations entered into a series of free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries that further restricted the flexibilities under TRIPS with respect to pharmaceutical products. The terms vary but the theme remains the same: the agreements limit exclusions from or exceptions to patents and patentability. 84 Developing countries, anxious to benefit from FTAs, began to relinquish the flexibilities TRIPS had secured with regard to accessing essential medicines. 85 Whether TRIPS will permit developing countries to take advantage of its flexibilities will depend, to a significant degree, on the willingness of individual nations -such as Brazil, China, India and 'The Pharma companies are asking for and obtaining stronger protection for patents and regulatory data, and the reduction or elimination of price controls. . . strong monopolies and reduced regulatory flexibility threaten to exacerbate the already alarming disparity in medicinal treatment between rich and poor . . . The uncertainty created by the intellectual property chapters and the potential impact on developing country public health and intellectual property authorities should not be underestimated. Few governments wish to become engaged in a trade dispute with the United States and most lean toward erring on the side of caution.' Abbott (note 79 above) 353. Put another way, while TRIPS affords genuine flexibility in gaining access to the medicines necessary to meet public health crises in developing countries, these bilateral agreements erode such flexibility by requiring many developing countries to promulgate 'TRIPS plus legislation'. Such legislation often extends patent life beyond two decades and places severe restrictions on the use of compulsory licenses and other exceptions that would allow for the introduction of generic medicines. See t'Hoen (note 81 above).
South Africa -to resist political pressure from the developed world for additional IP concessions in FTAs. 86 (bb) Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act and the Patent Amendment Act South Africa's main muscle for accessing low cost medicines for its citizens is the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act. 87 The Medicines Act contains provisions for the transparent pricing of medicines, the parallel importation of patented drugs, and the generic substitution of patented medicines under certain conditions.
Prior to the Medicines Act's implementation, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa filed suit on behalf of 39 drug companies to prevent the law from taking effect. 88 The applicants contended that the Medicines Act contravened both the Constitution and TRIPS. 89 The gravamen of their complaint was that the Act granted the Minister of Health unlimited discretion to ignore the country's patent laws.
Shortly after the trial began in March 2001, it became clear that the section of the Medicines Act at the centre of the dispute was modeled on a draft legal text prepared by the WIPO Committee of Experts. Given WIPO's involvement, and WIPO's role in TRIPS enforcement, it became impossible for the drug companies to argue that the Medicines Act violated TRIPS. 90 In strong international support for South Africa's attempt to provide cheaper medicines to meet a public health epidemic, the companies dropped the suit. 91 While the suit ultimately set no legal precedent, the outcome tilted the balance of power back, ever so slightly, toward developing countries. At a minimum, multinational drug companies recognized that they had very little to gain by their aggressive enforcement of publicly unpopular legal positions.
(cc) The Competition Commission, the Competition Tribunal and voluntary licenses
The withdrawal of the suit did not end the legal wrangling. During the litigation, the drug companies acknowledged that they had offered the South African government reduced prices on anti-AIDS medicines. It 91 The story behind the suit exemplifies the power politics at its most raw and rarefied. The South African government argued that its legislation conformed to TRIPS, relying on the flexibilities available in Paragraph 6. A spokeswoman for the Ministry of Health stated that equal access to health care in South Africa was constitutionally protected and that the access problem was so deep it required a 'major structural intervention.' The US subsequently denied Pretoria's request in 1998 for additional benefits for health care products under the Generalized System of Preferences ('GSP'). The GSP allows developing countries to import products with duties set at reduced rates. was an offer that the South African government had concealed and, evidently, failed to leverage. 92 This apparent failure on the part of the South African government was particularly galling given that it had continued to claim -during the litigation -that the high prices of ART prohibited a national AIDS treatment programme.
By 2002, with the price of ARV drugs still unaffordable for the majority of South Africans, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) lodged a complaint with the Competition Tribunal which asserted that a proposed merger between Glaxo Wellcome and Smithkline Beecham would so increase the new company's South African market share as to inevitably lead to monopoly-like prices for a significant number of ARVs. 93 The 99 And yet, despite concerns that a strong IP regime retards the ability of governments in the developing countries to provide essential medicines, we have seen evidence that South Africa's IP regime has sufficient flexibility to allow both public officials and private Voluntary licences (VL) enable local manufacturers to produce and sell generic versions of our products. A decision to grant a VL depends on a number of factors including the severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in that country, local healthcare provision and the economic and manufacturing environment. . . . Selecting the most appropriate licensee is key. We need to be sure that the manufacturer will be able to provide a long-term supply of good-quality medicines and will implement safeguards to prevent the diversion of medicines to wealthier markets. Ibid 21. However, a genuine pecuniary interest attaches to well-enforced voluntary licenses that makes them extraordinarily attractive to pharmaceutical companies. The licenses ensure better resource allocation and utilisation in the markets where pharmaceutical companies derive the better part of their profits: Europe, North America and parts of Asia. Voluntary licenses eliminate the production and the marketing of high cost drugs in regions that will show little or no meaningful profit. actors to deliver low cost generics. What is most important for the argument of this paper, however, is that the IP regime in South Africa creates the space for a government-led industrial policy that will enable private companies to exploit voluntary agreements for the benefit of all South Africans.
(iii) Fairness, Equity and Efficiency in the Public Procurement of Drugs
We have adumbrated above the constitutional obligations imposed by the Constitution on the South African government with regard to the right to access health care services. We have also noted both the possibilities and the limitations of the international and domestic IP regimes within which the South African government must operate when devising an appropriate ART programme. In this section, we describe and then analyze the government's policy response to these imperatives and constraints. 
101
In procuring an affordable supply of low cost medicines for the public rollout, the Public Finance Management Act ('PFMA') requires good financial management and the effective and efficient use of limited resources to maximize services delivery.
102 Government was thus obliged to create a tender programme that would ensure the delivery of drugs at the lowest possible price. To that end, the task team appointed by the Minister of Health for the ARV rollout recommended that the state invite all bidders and pre-qualify the companies that met the stated criteria. In response to the gazetted tender ( expressed interest. 103 This group was later reduced to eight companies that had registered their ARV products and received regulatory approval from the South African Medicines Control Council -the South Africa equivalent of the US Federal Drug Administration. In March of 2005, one year after the pharmaceutical companies were asked to submit their bids, the South African government announced the award of contracts to seven pharmaceutical companies 104 that would supply the needed ARVs for a period of three years in the amount of R3.4 billion. 105 The aim of the roll-out was to supply drugs to a 500,000 patient cohort by 2007. 106 Consistent with the PFMA, the Operational Plan calls for a system of drug procurement that 'attempts to secure antiretroviral drugs at prices well below today's best international prices' with a view towards creating fully integrated production facilities for those drugs in South Africa. 107 The Operational Plan cites the maintenance of strong intellectual property rights as essential to fostering innovation and industrial development and states that government will consider various measures to ensure access to affordable medicines:
The introduction of ARVs to the care and treatment of HIV and AIDS must comply with South African patent law and international obligations under the TRIPS agreement. However, the prices of patented and/or branded drugs supplied by the manufacturers may prevent equitable access to necessary drugs for South Africans. Recent international trade agreements and the South African law provide a number of ways to address this dilemma. Therefore, if it is deemed necessary and expedient, the government may consider the implementation of measures such as voluntary licensing, compulsory licensing and parallel importation to purchase drugs at affordable and favourable prices. 108 Similarly, the National Drug Policy draws attention to:
. . . the lack of equity in access to essential drugs, with a consequent impact on quality of care. Furthermore, rising drug prices, already high in international terms, gave increasing cause for concern, as did evidence of irrational use of drugs, losses through malpractice and poor security, and cost-ineffective pharmaceutical procurement and logistic practices.
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On paper, both documents suggest a far-reaching and forward-looking view of drug procurement. 110 On the ground, the reality looked somewhat different.
Cabinet announced the ARV rollout in November of 2003. But by the 25th of March 2004, the Department of Health, pressed by the threat of legal action by activist organisations such as the Treatment Action Campaign, announced that they would need to purchase an emergency supply of antiretrovirals as a stop-gap measure until the formal tender process for drug procurement was concluded. 111 In May 2004, drug shortages were well-documented and patented medicines unavailable. In the midst of such drug shortages, Andy Gray observed that the Government was in the unenviable position of possessing 'some generics -sitting with the Medicines Control Council for more than a year awaiting registration' -and being obliged 'to purchase [ARVs] from brand name sources' at substantially higher prices.
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The government has, however, had some success with respect to its macro-economic and macro-pharmaceutical policy. First, government's drug procurement approach must be measured against reasonable benchmarks. One such benchmark is the respective costs of drugs in the public sector and the private sector. In 2004, the basket of pharmaceutical products purchased by private health care providers came to R13 billion. In 2004, the basket of pharmaceutical products purchased by state -and made up to a significant degree by genericscost a mere R3 billion. 113 The ability of the state to leverage significant savings for South Africans and the public health care system through the purchase of generics is obvious. Second, the state can take partial responsibility for the success of recent initiatives by Aspen Pharmacare ('Aspen'). A Strategic Investment Programme and the promise of a fullscale national rollout induced Aspen to invest R182 million in a 110 The drug procurement system envisaged in the Operational Plan was intended to meet five stated objectives. First, the medicines would be of the highest quality and licensed by the South African Medicines Control Council. Second, the medicines would be appropriate to the treatment regimens outlined in the Operational Plan. Third, the supply of medicines would be secure and sustainable at a volume large enough to meet the expected demand. Fourth, medicines would be purchased at the lowest possible prices. Fifth, a sustainable supply would be ensured through local production of antiretrovirals and sustainable financing. And, the Minister of Health would appoint a negotiating team to implement the procurement strategy recommended in the plan. manufacturing facility in Port Elizabeth capable of producingamongst other items -significant amounts of generic ARVs. 114 On the back of that investment, and the 'promise' of a mass ART programme, Aspen has secured voluntary licenses from a significant number of patent-holders to produce a broad array of ARVs.
115 This loose, but apparently efficacious, relationship between the public sector and the private sector answers the Operational Plan's cri de coeur -'if it is deemed necessary and expedient, the government may consider the implementation of measures such as voluntary licensing, compulsory licensing and parallel importation to purchase drugs [for the rollout] at affordable and favourable prices' 116 -without the political and economic risks associated with permissible patent-breaking measures.
It would, therefore, be incorrect to suggest that the government has done nothing by way of voluntary licenses, compulsory licenses or parallel importation to reduce drug prices. The real, and constitutionallymandated question, is whether the government has done enough to realise its public commitment and legal obligation to create a genuinely sustainable ART programme. At this stage, we believe that the government has not done so.
That more can be done is evinced, once again, by the experience of Brazil. Orsi observes that the decline in ARV prices for Brazil was a function of the role of public laboratories in local production and the willingness of the Ministry of Health to threaten to use compulsory Of course, parallel imports are of concern for pharmaceutical manufacturers because they permit drugs purchased at lower prices in the developing world to be resold in the developed world at substantially higher market prices. Such arbitrage naturally robs pharmaceutical manufacturers of expected profits in their primary markets.
licenses. 117 As a result of that approach -political savvy combined with a commitment to exercise the flexibilities afforded by TRIPS -Brazil's Ministry of Health has obtained a 75.2 per cent decrease on average in prices on non-patented and locally-produced ARVs. 118 It has also been able to use the threat of local production to leverage substantially lower prices from multinational pharmaceutical companies. South Africa's Department of Health cannot yet make such claims.
In terms of drug pricing, the dominant rate-limiting factor in South Africa is a lack of meaningful competition amongst suppliers.
119 Our primary thesis remains that the state's ARV rollout evinces a sub-optimal procurement approach because South Africa has not constructed an industrial policy that would effectively exploit the economic potential we possess. 120 Because we believe that a sustainable ART programme as an effective social policy is contingent upon an industrial policy that promotes the local production of generic ARVs, it is to the lineaments of such an ideal social policy married to industrial policy that we now turn.
(b) Priming the pump: how a new industrial policy for the pharmaceuticals industry in South Africa can create the capacity for local private production of generics and provide the basis for a sustainable ART programme
In this section, we contend that the establishment of a sound generics pharmaceutical industry in South Africa is not only possible, but that it may be the only way of creating a sustainable ART programme. Under extant circumstances, a procurement strategy which has as its end the supply of ARVs for the greatest number at the lowest cost would -through shared economies of scaleplace downward pressure on price.
We possess a public procurement policy that, although not without limitations, secures drugs for the public sector at about 25 per cent of the price paid by the private sector. We have an intellectual property regime with sufficient flexibility to use voluntary licenses to enhance the production of ARVs and other anti-AIDS treatments. We possess a well-developed financial sector capable of identifying solid domestic investments and a sufficiently robust economy to fund them. We have a Department of Trade and Industry that (can and) must produce a sectorspecific strategic investment policy that could give our own nascent generics industry something of a competitive advantage for ARV production in an otherwise highly competitive global industry. In South Africa, the access to ARVs has no meaningful legal barrier or insuperable financial constraint.
What we have, instead, is a failure of political will as well as something of a market failure. These two impediments to a successful ARV programme can be corrected, in part, with by an appropriate socioindustrial solution: the creation of the economic environment required for a generic drugs industry for ARVs.
(i) No compulsory license
Before we explain the rudiments of an ideal industrial policy that draws on South Africa's strengths, it is, perhaps, worth spending a moment and thinking about why compulsory licenses -or the threat of compulsory licenses -are not a viable policy option for South Africa. Such an explanation is warranted when authors in this Journal, such as Thomas Bollyky, argue that by not exploiting the opportunities afforded by such licenses, the South African government is abdicating its responsibility in terms of s 27.
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Although the use of a compulsory license does not require the capacity to produce the drug in question, issuing a compulsory license as a threat to reduce prices for patented drugs does. To meaningfully make such a threat one first requires the basic science capacity to reverse engineer the API. Pharmaceutical agents -patented or not -often have very complicated molecular structures that, as in the case of ARVs, can require between 30 and 100 or more steps of chemical synthesis.
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(Failure to accurately replicate any one of these steps will lead to an inefficacious and sometimes dangerous product.). 123 The conversion process for ARVs, and especially the newer line ARVs, is exponentially more complex. But let us assume for the sake of argument that we had the basic science community required to reverse engineer APIs. After all, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was able to successfully produce small quantities of nevirapine in the late 1990s.
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(Unfortunately, the government was not then interested in creating the conditions for mass production.) There is, however, a palpable difference in the processes required for the production of small quantities of a generic drug, and the processes required for the mass production of that same drug. South Africa has committed itself to the production of bioequivalent drugs -an appropriately high standard. 125 This exacting standard knows no shortcuts.
Why not try to create this capacity? Some South Africans have. In the 1990s, AECI, a large industrial chemicals corporation, attempted to create a vertically integrated pharmaceuticals business (for penicillin and various derivatives). Over little more than a decade, AECI only managed to manufacture lysine, an amino-acid. It lacked the technical capacity required to complete the jump from lysine to the desired antibiotics. (Moreover, it lacked the technical capacity to make the jump despite the fact that the desired antibiotics were no longer under patent. That is, the patent was not the bar to generic production -the working knowledge possessed by the original manufacturer of the antibiotics was.)
Another reason is cost. Not only is the required investment for a suitable reverse engineering lab and generics plant substantialestimates range from R150,000,000 to R200,000,000 (excluding the greenfields and tax credit expenditures that would be required from government), the cost of the final products might dramatically outweigh any benefit to be had in producing them. As it now stands, it currently costs more to source the raw materials for APIs in South Africa than it 'It is not enough to say that a given pharmaceutical product produces the same pharmaceutical or therapeutic effect as the original. Regulatory agencies need to ensure that manufacturing follows international standards of good manufacturing practices, and they need to ensure the quality of the pharmaceutical supply. Some authors have raised doubts about the capability of drug regulatory agencies to do so The importance of ensuring the quality of the medicines supplied cannot be overemphasized, especially in view of the increasing presence of counterfeit drugs.' Moreover, as the article points out, the term 'generic' has different meanings within and across countries, leading to further problems of classification and regulation: 'The result is that generic drug policies relate to the use of similar drugs (or copies), and in daily speech most policy-makers, consumers, and many health professionals use the terms generic and similar interchangeably, which further confuses the issue. ' does to offload in Durban a finished API produced in China. Why, assuming access to those APIs continue to exist, would we wish to create more expensive APIs?
As we have already seen, questions about long-term availability of drugs from China, India and South Korea persist. But given that 70-80 per cent of the cost of an ARV is associated with the production of the APIs, 126 only significant economies of scale would warrant the investment necessary to create a varied and sustainable supply.
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Putting aside for a moment the daunting hurdle of establishing a fine chemicals industry capable of producing the APIs required for ARVs, we would still need an adequate manufacturing base. South Africa does not yet possess one. As we shall see in the next section, Aspen Pharmacare has entered the breach and has created a plant in Port Elizabeth with enormous capacity -enough to supply 70 per cent of the public ARV rollout for the first three years. Other local generic manufacturers have entered the market and will compete with Aspen in the next round of government tenders.
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(ii) Voluntary licenses, sector-specific investment policies and an enhanced manufacturing base
(aa) Voluntary Licenses
Our thesis is that just about everything that can be done by compulsory licenses can be done better by voluntary licenses. Multinational pharmaceutical companies are not philanthropies. And they don't act like them. However, they do behave rationally in so far as their profits are concerned. South Africa currently constitutes a mere 0.3 per cent of the world market for pharmaceuticals. Africa, in total, accounts for just over 2 per cent of that market.
129 So while no company has any interest in selling their product for less than the market will bear, multinational pharmaceutical company profits do not turn, in any significant degree, on their share of the African or the South African markets. As a result, these companies have demonstrated a willingness to engage in differential pricing for developed countries and developing countries. The primary concern for multinationals is re-exportation. Multinational companies do not want to find themselves in a situation in which they have supplied drugs at favourable terms to a developing country such as South Africa, only to find those same drugs being resold at much higher prices in Europe and North America. The companies have a vested interest in preventing such arbitrage. 130 Voluntary licenses secure multinationals the patent protection they require, and, most importantly, prevent the re-exportation of drugs to markets where the companies do see the greater part of the return on their investments. Best of all, they are generally free and come with the necessary technology transfers required to make effective use of the intellectual property on offer. For example, in the settlement agreements between the TAC and Boehringer Ingelheim and GlaxoSmithKline ('GSK'), GSK and Boehringer Ingelheim were willing to provide voluntary licenses for nevirapine, AZT and 3TC to Aspen Pharmacare and Thembalami Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd for manufacture and distribution within South Africa and for export to 47 countries in Africa for a royalty of no more than 5 per cent of net sales. 131 In the intervening four years since the TAC settlement, Aspen Pharmacare has entered into voluntary and quasi-voluntary license agreements (as well as technology transfers) with Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Gilead Sciences, GSK and Boehringer Ingelheim that require no royalty payments at all. Aspen has formed a joint venture with Indian generic manufacturer Matrix -and thus secured a 50 per cent stake in Asterix -to ensure ongoing access to and future large scale production of APIs. 132 Once again, these agreements demonstrate that voluntary licenses can -in the right environment -be exploited in the service of a free, universal ART programme for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. The government -in the form of the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Health and the Treasury -are aware that a vast domestic health care market exists to be exploited by South African industry for the benefit of South Africans. The current South African share of this R110 billion market is miniscule. We currently import 65 per cent of our drugs, 90 per cent of our medical devices, nearly 100 per cent of our medical diagnostics and 100 per cent of our vaccines. The government is on record as wanting to increase South Africa's market share in those four areas both to advance the socio-economic needs of the nation and to ensure that our current trade-deficit does not worsen as the need for more expensive drugs, devices and diagnostics increases (as it surely will if all those who require ART receive it.) 134 The dominant mechanisms of industrial policy in the neo-liberal framework within which we operate involve the use of financial and tax incentives to spur investment in certain sectors of the economy. South Africa uses a mix of policy incentives to induce the private sector to invest in technological innovation projects and employment-generating industries. 135 The national Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is responsible for fiscal incentives to encourage private sector participation in research and development. 136 To this end, the DTI established clusters of Strategic Industrial Projects (SIP). SIP was designed to 'significantly contribute to growth, development and competitiveness of specific industry sectors by providing industrial investment allowances, in the form of tax relief.' 137 The most significant SIP project for the purposes of a sustainable ART programme involved an Aspen Pharmacare project. Aspen Pharmacare invested R182 million in a manufacturing plant in Port Elizabeth. 138 That facility gives Aspen the capacity to produce sufficient first line and second line ARVs to service South Africa and, potentially, the rest of the continent. (As we have indicated above, Aspen now provides 70 per cent of the drugs for the state's current ARV programme.
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) DTI has also approved another important SIP project that would allow for the expansion of the Roche Products (Pty) Ltd plant in Isando to achieve Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) status.
140 This status will allow Roche to manufacture an anti-malarial drug, Fansidar, for the world market and may enable Roche, eventually, to produce other essential medicines. (cc) Enhanced manufacturing capacity and a reliable source of APIs
Of course, all the manufacturing capacity in the world will be of no use whatsoever without access to the critical component of pharmaceuticals: APIs. Moreover, legitimate concerns have been raised that as the AIDS pandemic reaches India and China, those two countries will soak up all of the available APIs and generic ARVs that they produce domestically. That could leave South Africa out in the generic cold. There are, however, several possible solutions to this problem. First, we could produce our own generics. As we have already seen, the costs of such investment are immense -if not prohibitive. That said, some investment in the ability to produce APIs may be necessary to ensure a sustainable supply of ARVs.
Secondly, we could enter into technology transfer agreements. Such agreements would not require South Africa or South African companies to re-create the wheel. South-to-south technology transfer agreements have the additional virtue of securing the benefits of innovation for developing countries and ensuring that they are not locked out of markets currently dominated by corporations located in the developed nations of the world. A number of technology transfer arrangements are well underway across the African continent to facilitate such infrastructure building, technical expertise and knowledge transfer. Brazil has given $100,000 in technology transfer grants to five countries in Latin America and five in Africa to help develop local generics industries for ARVs. The Thai government has offered technical support to Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe to set up pilot manufacturing plants. (Zambia hopes to sell ARVs to 13 countries in Africa.
142 ) As we have already seen, Aspen Pharamacare has secured technology transfers from most of the pharmaceutical companies from whom it has sought voluntary licenses. Moreover, the government's own Operational Plan endorses such technology transfer agreements.
Thirdly, the South African government could promote joint ventures between local manufacturers and foreign producers of APIs. Aspen entered into a joint-venture agreement with Matrix, of India, to manufacture active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) by selling half its share of Fine Chemicals. The joint venture and share swap gives Aspen immediate access to a panoply of APIs required to produce generics. (Aspen's share swap with Matrix gives it a 50 per cent stake in Asterixa leading producer of APIs.) By giving Matrix a significant interest in Fine Chemicals, Aspen also puts Fine Chemicals -a South African company -in a position to expand the kinds of generics it produces. With Enaleni's recent acquisition of Cipla Medpro, South Africa has the potential to create another strong local producer of ARV generics, and with it a more competitive market. As t'Hoen and Moon emphasize, generic competition is one of the most potent instruments that policymakers have to effectively lower ARV drug prices.
(iii) Industry Fundamentals and Prospects
On the credit side of the ledger, South Africa has the largest pharmaceutical industry on the African continent: the manufacturers' market was valued at $3 billion in 2005. 144 The country has a sophisticated transportation infrastructure, a highly developed industrial base underpinned by a modern telecommunications sector, and an economy with an average growth rate of 3 per cent per annum for the period 1995 to 2004. 145 According to the annual report of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa, 'recent evidence points to the South African generic market by value (sic) ranking as the largest among the generic markets of the world's major pharmaceutical markets.' 146 The industry's position on a generics industry is favourable:
It is a myth that the research based pharmaceutical industry is opposed to the use of generics. Internationally, industry believes that generics, introduced following an adequate period of market exclusivity and within an appropriate regulatory policies and processes, offers . . . consumers legitimate choices.
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The industry supports the manufacture of generic medicines within the context of a strong regulatory environment with stringent quality control procedures.
However, questions exist about South Africa's ability to train and retain a skilled workforce. First, although the state has embarked upon various interventions to address problems such as poor performance in mathematics and science and the emigration of qualified professionals, 148 it will take some time for the positive effects of such programmes to be realized. Second, one intractable feature of the pharmaceutical industry is the high fixed cost associated with research and development. (In general, South African R&D is weak: combined public and private expenditure in R&D rests at 0.7 per cent of GDP, contrasted with a typical OECD expenditure of 2.15 per cent.
149 ) However, low marginal costs of production can offset R&D investment if access to markets -such as that for the public sector treatment of HIV/AIDS -can be ensured.
IV CONCLUSION
South Africa and other developing countries would be ill-advised to rely on the philanthropic spirit of pharmaceutical companies in the form of drug donations and discounts when attempting to secure access to lifeprolonging medication.
151 South Africa has the wherewithal to ensure sustainable access to such medicines through the promotion of an industrial policy that harnesses existing manufacturing capacity.
While we have seen that South Africa does not currently possess the industrial capacity required to back up the threat of a compulsory license -even if compulsory licenses were a good idea -we have, at the same time, shown that voluntary licenses with tech transfers and continued access to APIs are the preferred pre-conditions for a successful South African generics industry. Put slightly differently, we are inclinedbased upon the historical record -to suggest that a consultative, . This DFID study analysed the evidence base for domestic production and greater access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. It concentrated on such factors such as quality; geographical accessibility; physical availability; acceptability; affordability. It also analysed other determinants of success such as the feasibility of domestic production of medicines to combat TB, malaria and HIV/AIDS; government strategy and policy; and the market. The DFID overview study found that a hypothetical generic company producing medicines under three different scenarios could be profitable as well as price competitive. The risks and limitations included the uncertainty in achieving a market share in a regional market, dependence on imported APIs and their fluctuating costs, and the need to produce at an international standard that meets GMP. The DFID study supports our more specific claims that South Africa requires an industrial policy that exploits a range of market incentives for the investment in the requisite infrastructure and that emphasises technology transfers, manufacturing capacity and a skilled workforce. See also Department of Trade and Industry (note 122 above). 151 See Lucchini et al (note 23 above); t'Hoen and Moon (note 129 above).
non-confrontational approach between government, local industry, civil society and multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers is likely to yield the kind of zero per cent royalty, backward technology transfers and distribution agreements that we require.
However we have also shown that we lack, as yet, a full-fledged and coherent government policy to exploit effectively our nascent ability to manufacture generics. 152 Why do we need a government policy? Because over one million South Africans will soon require access to ART through the public sector -the largest ART programme in the world. This public health crisis cannot be solved solely by market forces. Such a programme may, however, flourish with appropriate support from the Department of Health and the Department of Trade and Industry. Such support, as we noted in the previous pages, embraces appropriate tax relief, investment credits, technology transfer and assured access to APIs, the private pharmaceutical industry in South Africa. More importantly, only with such support are we likely to see a local generics industry that can compete as a producer of ARVs and be in a position to meet the state's ART requirements.
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Such a strategy alone may not ensure that we have the capacity to produce all of the drugs that South Africa's current HIV-infected population requires. However, we contend that the failure of the government to pursue aggressively a policy with a high likelihood of success could well be viewed by the Constitutional Court as an abdication of the state's constitutional responsibilities under s 27. 152 See Abbott (note 79 above). 153 See Lucchini et al (note 23 above).
